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Dr. Milan BARTOŠ

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ON the fifth of February Egypt requested an urgent meeting of the plenary session of the United Nations General Assembly, which had not yet closed its convening, to reconsider the Israeli-Egyptian conflict. The United Nations called upon Israel to respect its obligation under the 1949 general armistice, to cease fire and withdraw its troops to the starting positions behind the demarcation line. The United Nations Force was organized and ordered to supervise the implementation of decisions and observance of obligations and to be the factor which separates the formerly conflicting sides as well as to prevent mutual incidents. However, Israel refused to withdraw from the Gaza area and from the Akaba Bay and to return to the 1949 demarcation line.

What does this attitude of Israel amount to? We shall not consider whether Israel has or not any historical rights to the territory which it wishes to retain. We are not even entering into the question whether Israel needs this territory for the completion of its state community. We refrain from estimating whether this area is the cradle of the Arabs and indispensable for the establishment of peace and fulfilment of justice. We shall deal formally with these points.

a) The demarcation line exists;

b) The Israeli troops crossed the demarcation line contrary to the legal clauses and disturbed the armistice;

c) The United Nations passed resolutions calling upon all the three countries which tried to infiltrate themselves by force into Egyptian territory, to withdraw to the starting positions;

d) These countries promised to carry out the decision of the United Nations.

By refusing to return to the starting positions, Israel simultaneously breaks two clear obligations towards the United Nations, accepted under concrete relations with the UNO and a number of other obligations accepted along with the Charter. Israel violates its obligation under the general armistice on the one hand, and the obligation on saving the peace according to the resolutions of the General Assembly of November 5, and 7, 1956, on the other.

What sanctions can the United Nations Organization institute against a member who refuses to respect its decisions?

First of all, the General Assembly of the United Nations, exercising the power of the Security Council which was paralyzed by the veto, passed recommendations in November 1956 for the establishment of peace. Therefore, it provided the conditions by means of which the peace was to be saved, as everybody saw that it was threatened. These are the recommendations for the

saving of peace, provisional orders which must be carried out. If the General Assembly finds that Israel failed to observe these recommendations although its Government declared that it would respect them, there is no other choice than to recommend or order sanctions against Israel.

There are several groups of sanctions. But all of them are reduced to collective measures. The first group consists of non-military sanctions. That is, those measures which are laid down in Article 41 of the United Nations Charter, such as economic measures, prohibition of imports to Israel and from Israel, breach of diplomatic relations by all members of the United Nations, the suspension of all telegraphic, telephonic, postal, railway and air contacts. Some Western writers mention other measures as well. The Charter lays down that the United Nations Organization is authorized to exclude from its ranks, with a two-thirds majority, those member states which persist in nonobservance of the Organization's recommendations passed against a definite member, or if that member fails to submit to the realization of United Nations principles. Others think that such a decision would be too severe. Finally, there are those who consider that one should not stop at sanctions laid down in Article 41 but that these should be followed immediately by sanctions stated in Article 43, that is, order collective actions by the use of military forces — troops, naval units and air forces and compel Israel to withdraw from the territory which it occupied contrary to law. It is considered that such a sanction would be more of a principled nature than a concrete action, as it would show that states must respect accepted obliga-

tions undertaken not only towards individual countries but also towards the international community generally.

Therefore, divergences are not in whether action should be taken against Israel, but in how it should be taken, where is the limit to measures that are to preserve the authority of United Nations decisions. Some people consider that possibilities still exist for making Israel carry out the decisions of the United Nations by political measures, a fresh condemnation before public opinion, all the more so as it had accepted that decision. Others are convinced that it would not do, as yet, to resort to arms, particularly because this might be used by some powers to undertake new interventions, but that means for influencing Israel should be widened, passing from the field of the so-called moral-political measures on to the sphere of collective measures which would be devoid of any military character. In doing so, the principle of the gradual application of measures should be respected, taking care not to skip measures laid down in Article 41 of the Charter. Those who start from the concept that radical measures are indispensable, immediately think of the collective measures of a military nature set forth in Article 42. It is difficult to be conclusive on this point before the countries have declared in what collective measures they wish to participate concretely. It might happen that a majority, convinced in the need for military measures, votes their use, while only a small number of countries with inadequate forces turn up later to carry out the sanctions which have been decided upon.

And this is the reason why realism must be counselled in the selection of means by which Israel should be compelled to respect obligations towards its neighbours, towards UNO and towards world peace.

Views and Opinions

THE COMMON MARKET AND FREE TRADE ZONE IN WESTERN EUROPE

Živojin JAZIĆ

THE forthcoming creation of a customs union and common market of the West European countries surrounded by a broader free trade zone (including other OEEC member countries, primarily Great Britain) doubtless represents the most extensive and far reaching attempt made so far towards the achievement of West European economic integration. Moreover the establishment of "Euratom", the special six country atomic energy pool which is also on the agenda, and the tendencies to revive cooperation within the framework of the comparatively inactive Western Union, yield a fairly adequate picture of the future development of regional integration in Western Europe. As distinct from the previous attempts at political and military integration the greatest efforts are concentrated at present towards the inter-connection of the national economies thus creating the basis for and necessitating the future integration in other sectors as well.

The initial ideas on a joint market and "Euratom", formulated at the Messina Conference in 1955, were more clearly defined in the draft interstate agreements whose conclusion and signature is impending, the former differences of view having largely been eliminated as compromise formulas have been found for a series of controversial issues.

The present common market scheme foresees a gradual and systematic reduction of customs and the removal of other restrictions with a view to ensuring the free circulation of goods, manpower and capital between the six countries. The lowering of tariffs would evolve in stages of several years, provided the transition from one stage to another would not be automatic as previously contemplated. France having succeeded in inserting the clause that it remained to be seen at the clause of the first stage whether the necessary conditions have been brought about for the transition into the second stage, or require the prolongation of the first. In this manner a vast common market for industrial and farm products would be created over a 15 to 17 year period, which would integrate markets of the member countries separated hitherto by their national frontiers and various barriers. While mutual trade would be freed of customs and other restrictions, uniform customs duties would be applied to third countries which should represent the arithmetic mean of the prevailing six national tariffs. With a view to eliminating the different conditions under which the individual countries will embark on the competitive struggle on such a market, the gradual equalization of the system of social grants which are valid at present in

the member countries has been foreseen at the request of France. This measure should actually lead to the extension of the system applied in France (primarily: equal salaries of men and women, the number of work hours a week, payment of overtime work, and childrens' allowance system).

Farm products will be subject to special treatment. They are included into the common market in principle, but are still subject to protectionist regulations with a view to protecting national agriculture. The participant states in the common market will retain the right to fix minimum prices for farm products, and ensure by other measures such as the conclusion of long term contracts for deliveries of farm products at guaranteed prices, by the benefits their farm producers enjoyed under national protectionism until a new common farm policy is formulated (which is actually conceived as "European" protectionism).

The common market will have its own organs and financial institutions. The managing body will be the Ministers Committee of the Governments of member countries which will reach decisions unanimously or by qualified majority, while a special European commission will implement such decisions in practice. Apart from this the new organization will also have its judiciary and parliamentary bodies. Although the organizational scheme is somewhat similar to the Coal and Steel community, there are vital differences, as the powers are vested in the Ministers Committee and not a supra-national body. It is obvious that the governments are not ready yet to entrust the bringing of vital decisions on the mode of establishment of a common market to a supra-national body.

The financial institutions which consist of the readaptation and financial investments funds are invested with a special significance. The former should facilitate the eliminations of the eventual adverse effects of a common market for workers (unemployment owing to the closing down of factories, requalification of workers etc.) while the latter would take part in the financing of project of common interest which could not be financed by other sources, and would primarily be used for the advancement of the less developed areas of the member countries and eventually their colonies in Africa. A satisfactory solution has not yet been found for the latter problem as the other participants especially the Germans, are not exactly enthusiastic about the Franco-Belgian proposal which calls for extensive financial commitment of the common market partners in investments in the African colonies in exchange for their inclusion into the joint market, without the right of influencing the policy towards these colonies which remain within the exclusive jurisdiction of the metropolises.

The free trade zone for which the initiative and proposal was given by Great Britain with a view to ensuring her participation in trade on the common market without joining the customs union, would be linked with the common market and would have a similar system of gradual customs reduction. The countries which would take part only in the free trade zone would retain their autonomous customs towards third countries, thus dispensing with a common external customs barrier.

The common market is actually an attempt to ensure a more favourable place for Western Europe in world trade. However it is generally known that West European trade in spite of its significant achievements so far, is comparatively lagging behind such industrial giants as the USA and USSR. The protagonists of integration consider that this is primarily due to the excessive parti-

tioning of the West European economy into a series of relatively narrow national markets which do not afford sufficient scope and impetus for the development of production forces based on the latest technology and a more rational division of labour thus achieving a high level of labour productivity, and laying the necessary foundations for economic progress and the steady improvement of the standard of living. The removal of national economic limits would open up a market for about 160 million consumers (and more if the free trade zone is included) which should enable Western Europe to restore its lost positions on the world market and affirm itself as an equal economic factor with the two biggest world powers. This reasoning is not devoid of political aspects as the plans of economic integration are linked with the political ambitions of some West European circles who wish to create a third world bloc through the integration which would also enable the preservation of the positions of the West European colonial powers.

Although the arguments on the advantages of large markets for modern production are doubtless justified on the whole, this does not mean that every national market is doomed to stagnation in advance, namely that if disposing with export surpluses national economies do not stand a chance of achieving progress and prosperity. On the other hand it is still a question whether the necessary conditions which would guarantee the success of such an undertaking as a common market are ripe in Western Europe. The unequal levels of labour productivity and price disparities, have created different starting platforms and prospects in the forthcoming competitive struggle on the joint market. Comparatively speaking the outlook is brightest on the future common market for the industry with the lowest expenses and highest productivity. West Germany has such an industry and is therefore joining the common market under the most favourable auspices of all the partners. It is characteristic that in spite of the emphasis laid on the common interests and objectives the individual partners are acceding to the organization with their own objectives thus giving rise to various contradictions. This is also no wonder in view of the fact that every country is contemplating integration from the standpoint of the preservation and consolidation of its position, so that to a greater or lesser extent integration is the instrument of the national policies of the individual countries. A cursory survey of the attitude of the individual countries clarifies their positions and dilemmas.

The French position is exceptionally complicated. Economically insufficiently prepared (relatively higher production expenses and adverse trade balance) France wishes to improve its seriously shaken international position and resolve her economic and colonial problems through integration. The common market partners conceded to most French demands which aimed on the one hand at improving the competitive position of the French economy, and on the other hand at creating a given mechanism of protection from the negative repercussions during the period of transition. (France will retain the system of import taxes and export subsidies until improving her balance of payments). Whether such guarantees are sufficient to adjust the French economy to the new condition and regime of such a market in due time is another question, especially in view of the high level of unproductive expenditure, the eventual outflow of private capital to other countries with more favourable conditions of sale and as well as the pressure the other

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partners in the organization of the common market will exert on France in case the latter lags behind all the time and benefits excessively by the protective clauses afforded. The French consider German competition to be the greatest danger and a source of anxiety and opposition among influential circles which could be more strongly manifested in the phase of ratification.

Italy has a very favourable attitude and contemplates the common market as an important element for the solution of her fundamental problems (chronical labour surplus, need to increase exports, capital shortage for development of its underdeveloped areas). The Benelux does not have an identical attitude. The Dutch were opposed to the scheme for a long time, unsatisfied by the treatment reserved for farm products where protectionist clauses have been retained, owing to their interest in exports of agricultural products. As for the members of the free trade zone the attitude of Great Britain is clear cut; Britain wishes to apply the regime in that zone exclusively to industrial products, which

is unlikely to meet with the approval of those OEEC members (Denmark for example) in whose exports farm products occupy an important position.

It is certainly premature to forecast the efforts of the new attempts at integration as it is not yet quite certain whether the aforementioned projects will be implemented in their present form. However every economic unification which would lead to the creation of a new economic (and hence also political) bloc would not correspond to the needs of broad international economic co-operation which can only be impaired by separatist bloc tendencies. This is a particularly delicate problem for the underdeveloped countries, as the common market should unify a group of highly industrialized countries which dispose of vast economic potential and from which the less developed countries expect assistance and cooperation in their efforts to emerge from their backward state.

The Position of Slovene Schools in Italy

B. MILANOVIĆ

DURING inter-war period, the question of the protection of national minorities affected Italy and Yugoslavia in an unequal way. Under a collective agreement (an annex to the Saint Germain Treaty of 1919) which Yugoslavia concluded with the leading Allies, Yugoslavia undertook to respect the rights of the minorities under the control of the League of Nations. Italy, on the other hand, was not required to sign the agreement, because, as the President of the Committee for Minorities, Lord Cecil, said, the League of Nations considered Italy's culture and traditions to be the sufficient guarantee that she would treat her minorities in a decent way. Benefiting by this decision of the Supreme Allied Committee in Paris, Italy throughout the inter-war period was refusing to enter into any bilateral obligation with Yugoslavia on the matter, while Yugoslavia — under all agreements with Italy, beginning from the Rapallo Treaty to the Belgrade Stojadinović—Ciano Conventions — was fulfilling definite obligations towards the Italian minority in Yugoslavia. Long before the fascist came to power, the Yugoslavs in the Julian March were subjected to terror. The Italian governments then said that this was the revenge of Italian patriots against the Yugoslavs who had persecuted them under Austro-Hungarian rule, although Austria — owing to its loyalty to the Vatican — had always been treating the Italian minority more favourably than the Yugoslavs. Then Mussolini rose to power even the few remaining liberties enjoyed by the Slovenes were suppressed. All Slovene schools were closed and even priests were not allowed to communicate with their parish members in their native tongue. A whole series of rules sanctioned the forcible Italianization of Slovene names, for it was considered that they would thus be completely assimilated within a few generations. But although they were — for twenty years — deprived of their national schools, and often prevented from using their native language in public, the Slovenes and Croats from forty three counties which were under Italy showed, during the National Liberation War and when a part of the Julian March came under the control of the Allies, that they had not for-

gotten their origin and that they remained firm fighters for their national rights.

During the Allied military administration of the Julian March several attempts were made to ensure free national development of all national groups living in the province. This was partially achieved. The youngest generations then learned to write and read in the language spoken in their districts, and most of them took this as an encouragement to cultivate their national traditions and the spirit of their nationality.

In practice, the rights of the national minorities were not equally recognized in both parts of the Julian March even then. In the part administered by the Yugoslav military government the Italians were free to enjoy their cultural life; the Italian language was the official language in municipalities and public institutes. In the regions under the Allied administration, however, Yugoslavs who fought under the command of Marshal Tito during the war began to be persecuted on the allegation that war acts were criminal offences. For instance, men who had been requisitioning supplies for their units were being sentenced for violent looting.

The inadequacy of the Peace Treaty was the cause for the conclusion of a Statute on Minorities when the London Agreement was being negotiated. The Statute declared the problem of minorities to be a matter of legal protection. It was agreed then that a new agreement on the protection of minorities should be concluded and mixed committees formed to control the work of authorities and ensure that all citizens, no matter what their nationality may be, should be free to cultivate their cultural life. Such an agreement was concluded by Italy and Yugoslavia in the spring of 1955. But it was ratified by Italy only a short time ago, and it can now be expected that a mixed Italian-Yugoslav committee will soon start investigating all violations of minority rights, particularly acts of discrimination against members of minority groups.

The work of this committee is expected with great interest on the Adriatic coast, because people there consider it to be a guarantee that those who remained on the other side of the frontier will be treated as equal citizens.

So far there has been a lack of new rules on minority problems in Italy. The old laws do not provide for any rights of the minorities. These laws were enacted during fascist rule, and they do not treat minority members as equal citizens. Further, Italian courts are not concerned with provisions of international agreements. They hold that international agreements must be transformed into domestic legal acts if they are to be implemented at all.

While the people in the region of Trieste are awaiting the implementation of the Minority Statute, the Italian Parliament is debating a draft law on minority schools. The very fact that such a law is being enacted is encouraging, and we must praise the efforts of the Italian Government to solve the problem of minority schools in territories outside of Trieste. Judging by the text of the law, the right of the Yugoslav minority to cultural development, as far as schools are concerned, at least, will not be as wide as it should be. This law is based on Constitutional principles and is to be implemented in territories in which both Italians and Yugoslavs are living, i.e. in the so-called bilingual regions. Even now the Italian Constitution guarantees the right of the minorities to have their own schools in such regions, but this right cannot be implemented because Italian legal theory holds that the Constitution is not directly implemented, that it only sets down general principles which must be elaborated in special laws. Therefore, the Slovenes in the region of Gorica and Trieste expect the passing of the new law with great interest. They greet Article 1 of this law which states that in all schools of the region lectures are to be given in the mother tongue of the pupils. But while Italian schools in the said areas can be opened in an ordinary way, no one will be able to open Slovene schools without a special authorization of the President of the Republic. This is being justified by saying that Italian schools are maintained by the local self-governing organs while Slovene schools are to be financed by the general state budget. What is disappointing for the Slovenes are the provisions of the law under which any one can enroll into Italian schools freely, while those desiring to attend Slovene schools will have to get permission to do so from a special commission. The citizens who wish their children to attend Slovene school will have to provide evidence that they belong to the Slovene ethnic group, and before such evidence is accepted special school commissions headed by school inspectors will have to confirm that such evidence is acceptable as accurate. Similarly, the Slovenes of the districts of Gorica and Trieste are worried by the proposed composition of teaching staff. Teachers in Slovene schools need not be Slovene, but under equal conditions of competition teachers of Slovene origin will have priority of appointment. Thus Slovene teachers are eligible to serve in Slovene schools, but there is no guarantee that they will do so. Further there is no guarantee that they are to exercise leading functions in the system of Slovene schools in Italy.

We have said that the law on minority schools will be a step forward, for it will be a recognition in principle of the rights of the Yugoslav minority to cultural development. However, it is regrettable that this first step is not complete. We understand the concern of the Slovenes in Italy who ask themselves whether the law really provides adequate protection of the minority language groups. The Slovenes appreciate the efforts of the Italian Government to ensure unity bet-

PERSONALITIES AND POLICY

A COMMON TASK

As a rule advertising is an integral part of business and commerce, but it is far from being terra incognita in other spheres of human activity: the acts of certain American personalities have shown that it has already found a place in politics.

A certain Mr Wagner who would have remained unknown to us and many others who do not subscribe to the American „Who is Who“, although decorated by senor Franko, won the fame of a capricious film star overnight although he has little to do with films as the mayor of New York. Mr Wagner decided to boycott the welcome reception of King Saud, the official guest of President Eisenhower; instead of a military band and other honours, the head of Saudi Arabia was welcomed in Manhattan by a detachment of spick and span policemen.

Mr Wagner's name splashed across the front pages of the American and foreign press: a mayor defies a monarch! Thus risking his good name as a gentleman and host, Mr Wagner calculated that he had more to gain by becoming the „enfant terrible“ of the American administration.

Publicity was much more needed by the Senator from Wisconsin, but the golden times of Mc Carthy are a thing of the past. The developments have put him in the place in which he belongs, but he still dreams of limelight and of public attention. In the clamorous orchestra of voices who profited by the eventual visit of President Tito for the revival of the anti-Yugoslav campaign Mc Carthy's voice was strident: everything should be done to prevent this visit from taking place.

The genealogy of the witty ancestors of the Senator from Wisconsin doubtless includes Herostratus' name. His modest American descendant also does not choose the means in order to render his name immortal: fortunately it has already become a label which adequately qualifies the essence and character of any campaign in which it figures, the recent case being no exception.

The Republican leader in the US Senate, Mr Knowland is persistently endeavouring not to harmonize his personal views with those of the White House. In view of his extremist conceptions, this task is not particularly difficult. Whether this is a matter of conviction, temperament, political tactics, or wish to keep abreast of others at any price, is not important in this context: the essential thing is that Senator Knowland is a partisan of force strong arm tactics.

When Mr. Dulles recently intimated the possibility of sanctions against Israel, Senator Knowland hastened to state that the latter would be „immoral and impermissible“. What happened: has Senator Knowland suddenly become a sentimental moralist preaching the abstention from any form of pressure whatever?

We would have been confused or victims of an illusion if Senator Knowland had not remained true to himself: he would agree with sanctions only in case identical or similar measures being also enforced against Russia.

Three different personalities, three different cases, but one and the same attitude towards international cooperation. Messrs Wagner, Mc Carthy and Knowland do not represent the official or unofficial American attitude (the official America disclaims them, the unofficial does not even have to do so) but their voice is coming from America: therefore the less it is heard the better for America.

ween Italian and Slovene schools by introducing a uniform pedagogic and administrative system, but they, nonetheless, fear that their rights are not fully guaranteed. They would like to be able to see their children attend Slovene schools without any special permission.

The fears expressed by the Slovenes are not sufficient to state that the guarantees given to minorities by the two countries in their talks and contacts have been violated. We must really reckon with the new spirit of Italy, her democratic strivings and her wish to maintain good relations with Yugoslavia. We therefore believe that practice will shatter all such fears, but we also believe that the Italian legislators should not have accepted those provisions of the law which give rise to fears today, provisions which may be abused by irresponsible elements in the future. No doubt the new law will be a guarantee, but it will necessitate caution and great care on the part of those who will implement it and those who are to benefit from it.

In view of our system of minority rights, we cannot understand the view that a state's security and unity may be endangered if minorities are allowed to develop their own culture and attend schools in their own languages; we consider this right to be natural. It is certain that with the choice of regular and minority schools the minority schools will be chosen by those who really belong to minorities. If this right is suppressed, if the human consciousness is subjected to administrative control and censorship, the very right to national self-determination and all other human rights would be disrespected. The fear that this right will be impaired reduces our satisfaction with Italy's decision to solve the question of Slovene schools. We would be more satisfied if we could greet without reserves, an Italian law guaranteeing the freedom of the Slovenes in the districts of Gorica and Trieste to choose to attend Slovene schools without having to comply with any administrative conditions.

The Problem of the Insufficiently Developed Countries and International Policy

Pierre MENDES FRANCE

In this article the French Prime Minister, Pierre Mendes-France, states some of his views on certain aspects of the contemporary international situation. An economist by profession, Mr. Mendes-France concentrates on one of the crucial problems of today — the insufficiently developed countries and the relations of the international community towards them. He approaches the problem from the standpoint of present developments marked by the struggle for influence over the underdeveloped countries between the two rival blocs and in this context the author gives his own views both on the character and aims of blocs policy and the course the West should follow.

Although not entirely in agreement with certain views of Mr. Mendes-France on the problem, the editors of the „Review of International Affairs“ are publishing this article as an interesting contribution to a discussion, and are prepared to publish other articles which would deal with the problem from a different standpoint.

THE Western world is gradually becoming aware of a phenomenon, which some believed to perceive three years ago following Stalin's death but which was persistently denied by others: that a new phase of contemporary history has been initiated in which a struggle of a different character, primarily economic, strives to replace that which was commonly referred to as the "cold war" (a term which primarily connoted its salient military characteristics).

The reduction of the Soviet armed forces, seems to have eliminated the long standing fear of a sudden invasion of Western Europe by the Red Army, a threat against which an extremely expensive defence system was organized. Now this system should be readjusted and it is time to think of it. However the NATO Council stressed the aggravation of the military threat insisting on the need to strengthen the Western efforts in this field. For Europe this could only mean an increase of conventional armaments at a time when preparations for their reduction were carried out in the other camp. Is this not a fit occasion to stress, that, according to a well known formula, we lagged behind by a whole army or by an idea?

Some pointed to the danger to which the West was exposed by its exclusive preoccupation with the military aspect of the conflict thus letting its rivals assume the lead by shifting their efforts to another front, the economic.

It seems quite clear at present that in the cold war phase the Russians, not wishing war in the real sense of the word nonetheless exposed themselves to the danger of the latter: they used the *threat of war* in order to intimidate the West and force it to give in. However the development of atomic weapons led to a point when it can no longer be imagined that the Russians would really accept the risk of armed conflict, having realised that *sabre rattling* is no longer efficacious.

THE ECONOMIC BATTLE

At any rate one thing remained unchanged: capitalism was and remains the enemy of the Soviets; they are still convinced that its destruction is a foreordained thing and that it is their historical duty to contribute to its extermination. It is therefore clear that now when

their industrial successes have afforded them the means (which they hitherto lacked at least to a large extent) they are preparing to fight against capitalism in the future not with former military but economic means.

This process has been going on for years. When Malenkov was in power it seems that the Soviet efforts were primarily concentrated on the improvement of the standard of living. The development of the light industry, the stimulation of consumption were to have proved that the communist system is capable of rapidly raising the welfare and prosperity of the population, catching up with and subsequently surpassing the level reached by many countries of Western Europe and in this way offer an example to these countries which propaganda would use for the development of subversive activities, until, crumbling at one point and another, the entire capitalist system would at last be undermined.

Moscow soon temporarily abandoned this method, either because the objectives contemplated gave rise to greater difficulties and required more time than originally foreseen or because the need to extend assistance to the satellite countries and China contrasted with the other aims; the demotion of Malenkov, the reassignment of priority to the heavy industry, various statements by Bulganin and Khrushchev, their trip to Asia marked the adoption of a new strategy, that of economic expansion, boldly extended beyond the Soviet frontier throughout the world.

What should our reaction be to such a state of affairs?

We are doubtless justified in welcoming all that eliminates the danger of a conflict which would threaten to destroy the entire human civilization in blood and horror. But in would likewise be insensate to pretend that we are embarking on an era in which the peoples will limit themselves to rivalry with the limitation of danger as was done during the past century. The game will not consist in the winning of gold medals at an international exhibition. The competition will be keen and dangerous.

Another conclusion is therefore inevitable: the battleground has been changed by the transition from the military to the economic field. The new front is no longer located on the territorial frontiers of the two blocs. It spreads throughout the world through all countries, all areas known as the insufficiently developed countries and regions, which are logically driven by their poverty into the orbit of those who know how to help them most effectively. It is a question for both rivals to draw these countries into their sphere thus increasing their own forces to an extent when they will be, if possible, overwhelmingly superior to those of the enemy.

THE PROBLEM OF THE INSUFFICIENTLY DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

I have had the privilege, as the representative of my country, of taking part in the work of a regional commission of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, the commission for Latin America, and of attending the sessions of the World Bank.

I was most impressed by the fact that the delegates of countries from all continents became conscious of their common plight, namely that all the neglected and backward countries shared a fate which they considered unjust. In the United Nations Organization these coun-

tries became conscious of the fact that they are in the majority both by number and size of their populations and that united they would be in a position to impose their claims upon the rich countries, irrespective of the opposition encountered.

I followed the activities in the UN headquarters as well as in the Economic Commission for Latin America and the World Bank. At the same time the Government in Washington also continued its studies of this problem from which President Truman drew an extremely constructive conclusion proposing his well known Point Four programme of technical assistance to the underdeveloped countries on January 1949.

The technical assistance programmes (both UN and bilateral), are a result of these common efforts. They mark the first laps of a long and difficult journey. All reports submitted by the expert groups in the Economic and Social Council as well as the theoretical studies of many economists, for instance Mr. Prebic, the former Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Latin America, or Mr Nelson Rockefeller stressed the intricate and complex character of this problem.

The difficulty does not lie as one might assume in the fact that the developed countries are actually assisting their future rivals by assisting the industrialization of the underdeveloped countries by helping time to effect the transition from extensive low yield agriculture to a more varied and developed producer economy. Economic theory confirms that the development of these countries would give rise to new requirements thus enabling their markets to absorb ever larger quantities of imports. Moreover experience has shown that the economic development of young countries, the USA by the middle of the nineteenth century, Canada, Australia, South Africa and Argentina after the depression in 1875, was a common factor of expansion and prosperity. It must be taken in account that assistance to the underdeveloped countries is actually a stimulant for the economies of the industrialized countries whose effectiveness may be compared with the effectiveness of armament, but whose benefits are obviously more lasting and real.

A DIFFICULT SOLUTION

The obstacles are of an entirely different nature; in many respects they are greater than ever before, and it would be a mistake to believe in any miraculous remedy whatever. The discovery of atomic energy has opened hitherto undreamt of possibilities, but not in the immediately foreseeable future. Apart from this, vast power resources are not sufficient. They have not prevented the Middle Eastern countries, for example, from remaining economically undeveloped notwithstanding their wealth of oil resources.

The factors which impede industrialization, economic progress and the rise of the standard of living in the backward countries are many and numerous.

The gap which must be closed between the developed and the young underdeveloped countries by technological progress has been inordinately broadened; modern equipment is much more expensive than fifty years ago. The efforts required are far greater and longer, while the aspirations and impatience of the people strive to shorten them.

On the other hand the population increase of the poor countries is unusually rapid owing largely to the advancement of hygiene and medicine; in order to achieve a certain average improvement of the standard of

living it would be necessary to raise production much more than if demographic pressure were less strong. Greater attention and resources must also be devoted to diet. The possibilities of production and sale of essential products which are their staple exports have thus been impaired. Developed countries such as the USA and Canada are themselves producers of these primary products and in such large quantities which not only satisfy but exceed their internal requirements. The underdeveloped countries meet with this competition on the international market, in some cases it impedes their own exports a downward pressure on prices, thus impairing their terms of trade, which are developing to their disadvantage for centuries already.

To sum up, their import capacity is disproportionately lower than their development requirements.

However I would wish to call attention to the second fundamental aspect of this problem. The countries who wish to develop must make large scale investments; but to invest resources to save, and in the poor countries total capital formation accounts but for a very small percentage of the national income. In the insufficiently developed countries the rate of international capital formation is scarcely half and sometimes barely a third of that in the industrialized countries.

One can doubtless count with the assistance of capital imports; experience has shown however that private capital exports are low; the European countries, sometime capital exporters, no longer dispose with the same resources as before; American capital meets with more favourable conditions of investment at home or in Canada than in the insufficiently developed countries in which profits are low and sometimes nonexistent as the development of these countries requires large scale so-called infra-structural investments (roads; hospitals, schools etc.) which do not bring dividends.

Many efforts have been made in this respect and others are currently in progress: there is the World Bank Plan, the US Aid Programme, the European contribution, e. t. c.

However a mere glance at the existing figures shows the inadequacy of these measures. A group of experts has estimated in 1951 that in order to raise living standards an average 2% a year, the underdeveloped countries would require at least 10 billion dollars annually of foreign capital, namely 6 or 7 times more than they actually receive.

THE SOLUTION OFFERED BY THE USSR

This is a vast problem which confronts the Western world and the communist bloc has now put forward its solution.

The USSR has charted a resolute course towards the insufficiently developed countries offering them technical assistance according to the Western example. It became an importer of staple export surpluses (Argentine wheat, Egyptian cotton) which actually has concrete and still more significant psychological effect; it proposes the extension of credit (although the sums offered are low, not only by comparison with the actual needs, but also the credits granted by the West).

Apart from this however, taking themselves as an example, the Soviets are proposing such a type of economy, which in their opinion would be capable of compensating the inadequate rate of capital formation in the insufficiently developed countries and resolving their fundamental difficulties.

* * *

I do not doubt that the men who set up the Atlantic Defence System and checked communist penetration which was based on force are aware of these prospects.

They are obliged to realize that there is no time to lose, in order to shift the stress of the Western efforts to the economic front, where the battle may soon enter upon its decisive phase. Their awareness of this fact, is borne out by the request of President Eisenhower to the Congress and the American people for a substantial increase of foreign aid. This is not sufficient however. These are only the initial efforts which should be broadened and increased.

The amounts President Eisenhower requested in his proposal for the granting of credit are only a fraction of the amount stated by the UN experts as indispensable, even if to this we add the grants of the World Bank and the limited contribution of private capital, available for spontaneous investments. There still remains a substantial deficit to be covered.

Therefore the West should not stint its efforts and devote its maximum resources to the struggle which is developing around the underdeveloped countries.

EUROPE AND THE INSUFFICIENTLY DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

Europe, the impoverished Europe, should also take part in this task and it is also historically prepared to do so. I would only wish to deal with one aspect of the matter here, that which ensues from the fact that for some time already the European countries, primarily Great Britain and France have vast undeveloped regions under their influence. I will only review the development of their relations with their present or former colonies exclusively from the economic standpoint.

The contrasts between the colonial system in its original form, and the contemporary concept of development are conspicuous.

The prime objective of colonialism was the backward countries. The conquistadors exchanged tawdry finery for gold; after this the pioneers and settlers forced the oppressed natives to produce goods as cheaply as possible for the metropolis; when the slaves acquired their freedom, labour still remained insufficiently paid. It is true that the colonies also provided markets for the products of the metropolis, but the resources the latter drew from there remained of prime importance. „Give little, get much“, was the principle of the system.

As distinct from the foregoing, the present development trend leads to the sale of unproductive or insufficiently productive short term capital into the insufficiently developed countries; in this system one gives more than one receives! The present benefits of the donor country lie in the stimulus of its own economy (which is not always indispensable, however, especially when the national effort is committed to other tasks, either when the reconstruction of the country or its expansion is involved, or, which is far more frequent than is commonly believed, when the imperative development of the insufficiently developed areas within its frontiers is in question). As long term projects, the advantages of such schemes lie in ensuring the achievement of a better international balance in the political and social sense of the word in the consolidation of peace, and the defence of a form of civilization.

If the recent development of economic history is carefully examined, the tendency to gradually replace the colonial concept which is an object of almost daily attacks, by the principle of development of these countries can clearly be discerned.

These words are substantiated by facts: the British Colombo Plan for the development of Southeast Asia may be taken as an interesting example: the French plans for the equipment of their overseas possessions, although inadequate as a whole (in proportion to the actual needs which are enormous) and often insufficiently elaborate also represent an extremely serious financial effort.

Counter value is another important factor in this respect and consists in the change of direction of the balance of trade between the French metropolis and its overseas possessions in the postwar period. Instead of receiving goods of a higher value than those sold, French exports to these countries exceed imports by value. This is due to the implementation of the development plans which provide for additional imports of capital equipment, thus giving rise to trade balance deficits in the overseas countries. The metropolis covers the deficit by the extension of financial assistance, and low interest credits which concretize its assistance to the insufficiently developed countries under its trust.

French investments in the insufficiently developed countries for which she is responsible account for 2% of her national income for ten years or so; precisely the percentage experts laid down by the United Nations as the indispensable contribution of the developed countries to those underdeveloped. No other country in the world gives so high a percentage of its total resources to the insufficiently developed countries.

A MORE RAPID PROMOTION OF LIVING STANDARDS

It is here that a general observation should be made. The significance of assistance to the insufficiently developed countries may be theoretically sufficient, while remaining psychologically and politically ineffective, if it does not result in a tangible and fairly rapid improvement of the standard of living.

The question of North Africa arises. The government which I headed in 1954 appointed a studies group in October which also drew up a plan in this spirit which was to have been implemented in Algeria.

A markedly poor country in natural resources whose population is increasing at a record rate Algeria absorbed large capital investments during the past hundred years or so, which it is true, were not always invested most expediently. However, extensive infra-structural projects were carried out in Algeria and the financial assistance of the metropolis which is extended every year in different forms reached sizeable amounts. In spite of this, however, the average standard of living remained very low.

The studies group set up by the French government drafted the outlines of a new plan aiming at increasing the expenditure and consumption of the population and the increase of its standard of living by 6% annually. Therefore the subsidies and credits of the metropolis will be trebled during the next eight year period (thus reaching one quarter of the present national income of Algeria). The financing of private enterprises should stimulate their investments thus raising their volume

sixfold. I am glad to have given this vigorous initiative, which unfortunately came too late.

I would add that the French exchequer is continuing with the extension of substantial financial and technical assistance to Tunisia and Morocco for its economic social and cultural development.

VITAL SUPPORT

I believe that a far reaching lesson may be drawn from all the aforementioned facts if it is true that the existing political links between the economically developed and insufficiently developed countries depending on the former have undergone a process of evolution and will continue to change in the future, it is no less certain that the effects of a total rupture of these ties would be extremely serious for all concerned.

As for the insufficiently developed countries the severing of these links would cut off the support they need vitally and which they would certainly not find anywhere else. Owing to an intricate series of facts, geographical position, tradition, commercial, banking and even private relations, individual and common interests, etc., the country with which their fate was linked is inclined and even prompted to make a far greater effort than any other however rich.

This statement implies a certain degree of optimism. And this is why, in spite of the extreme difficulty of the problem of North Africa, the economic interests of the population speak in favour of conciliation. When passions die down, fanaticism and hatred abate, we may hope that reason will prevail.

I would not wish to conclude these thoughts with a matter which however important, primarily concerns my country.

It is true that the problem of the underdeveloped countries is so significant and extensive that it bears upon almost all questions which confront the world of today, even if not including them.

I have spoken a little earlier on the problem of the insufficiently developed countries and the measurement of strength between East and West. Precisely this is what is taking place, without bloodshed, but it is nonetheless decisive. Because we are deeply convinced that if the free world does not succeed in bestowing the blessings of its civilization on the neglected peoples, this failure would mark its twilight.

Whether the communists are inspired by this lesson or not for the transformation of their own system, they will sooner or later reach the irrefutable conviction that the future offers somewhat brighter prospects than resigned coexistence, that it belongs to the active co-operation of all peoples in the common struggle against fear, hunger and poverty, against all ills which momentarily still beset hundreds of millions of human beings throughout the world.

What a magnificent vista for common efforts improvement and progress! Truly, there is still so much to be done in this long suffering postwar world for people of good will that we cannot but contemplate the great destiny unfolding before us with hope and optimism.

CONGRESS OF WORKERS COUNCILS

Ivan BOŽIČEVIĆ

VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE CENTRAL COUNCIL OF THE YUGOSLAV
TRADE UNIONS

THE Congress of the Workers Councils of Yugoslavia will be opened in Beograd on June 25th. This will be the first such congress in the history of social development — a congress of the working class uniting two basic social functions — the function of producers and the function of managers.

The congress is arousing great interest and much significance is attached to it not only in the ranks of Workers Councils but also among the population generally.

The significance of the congress issues above all from the fact that workers self-management in production constitutes one of the essential bases of our socialist social organization. For the social ownership of the means of production and social management of enterprises, communes, public services and institutions — constitute an indivisible whole which also characterizes the socialist path of development of the Yugoslav society.

The day when the working collectives in enterprises were entrusted with the management of the economy marked the beginning of a profound, far-reaching process in which inevitable changes took place in different spheres: in regard to the functions and character of the state organs; in increasing the rights and role of the local communities; in the decentralization of administrative functions; in the principles of the economic system, in the methodology of planning, in the role of markets and operation of economic laws; in the democratization of internal relations in the work collectives, in the character of employment; in the consistent introduction of social management into fields outside of the economy — in education, cultural life, social and health institutions, in the social insurance, and housing policy; as well as in many other political and social institutions. Therefore, as it was to be expected, self-government in the economy is reflected all round and manifested in various ways.

The significance of the forthcoming congress also issues from the fact that this will be the first such gathering of representatives of the workers organs of management; as well as from the tasks which the Workers Councils have set before their congress.

The congress of Workers Councils will be held at a time when profound changes are taking place in our economy, on the basis of successes scored in the past period. The building of the heavy industry has created conditions for the orientation of our further economic development towards the construction and development of the light industry, that is, towards the production of consumer goods as well as towards raising production in agriculture. At the same time the import of consumer goods is increasing. The policy of raising the living standard has been placed in the foreground. These changes mean at the same time that Workers Councils are on the

threshold of a new economic situation — instead of an inadequately supplied market and almost permanently greater demand than supply (this situation predominated in our economy until recently), the market is becoming richer and richer which means that in the future the enterprises and their organs of management will increasingly be faced with the problems of the placing of their products, the problems of quality, assortment, prices. This means that in the future they will be confronted ever more sharply with the problems of increasing the productivity of labour, introducing more economical business methods, cutting production costs, etc.

The workers management of enterprises in Yugoslavia rose on the foundations of an undeveloped economy and this precisely at a time when the country, and above all the working class, exerted all their efforts to remove the consequences of backwardness and overcome the difficulties resulting from the well-known economic blockade of Yugoslavia.

The workers management of enterprises reaffirmed itself in that relatively brief period of its existence as an irreplaceable basis of our socialist social system and as an irreplaceable factor in production.

Workers management constituted in that period the basic source of the creative initiative of the working class and played a decisive role in overcoming all the difficulties and reaching the present stage of development. The results achieved are far greater and deeper than can be seen from the statistical data on production, on the productivity of labour or on the living standard. They are significant also in economy and in the field of creation of new social relations. They mean a definite conquest of qualitatively new positions in society on the part of the working class, they mark its transformation into the producer-manager. The direct producer ceases to be only an executor of another's will, he has finally realized the age-long tendencies: to produce and at the same time control the means of production and decide about the distribution of created values. And the question who decides about distribution is the essential question of every society, the criterion for the position of social groups and their mutual relations.

There is no doubt that the realization of the workers self-government is accompanied by a series of important problems and difficulties. This is quite understandable, above all because workers-management has been created in an undeveloped economy, with a young working class as well as because the exercising of the rights involved calls for a high degree of consciousness, knowledge, technical training. Besides, the setting up of the Workers councils called for changes in the economic system which caused certain difficulties to the organs of management. The transformation which took place when the enterprises were handed over to workers for management

is so profound and radical that it could not have been realised without difficulties even at a higher level of material development and with a more developed working class.

Besides, one of the most important tasks of the forthcoming congress is to make an estimation of past successes, to analyze the experiences, examine difficulties — and on the basis of all this visualize the further prospect of development and propose measures for the advancement of the system of socialist democracy.

II

According to the programme proposed by the Committee for the convening of the congress, it will be necessary to take a complete view of all the economic and social conditions under which the work collectives are managing enterprises in this country.

The problems which our rapid and exciting social development is daily posing to the working class, its organs of management, the social organizations and other social factors — are numerous. Conditions change with development, new needs arise, new solutions are called for as well as new contents and new forms. The important problems to be examined by the congress are as follows:

- economic conditions of the workers self-government: the material basis of self-government, distribution of the profits between the enterprise and the community, the status of the enterprise and its position in the communal state, the system of economic planning, the system of investments, the credit system, the market, prices and similar questions.

- wages and salaries: the method of determining pay scales and internal distribution, independence of enterprises in respect of remuneration; the role of the Workers Councils in the settlement of the problem of the living standard;

- the economic policy of enterprises, problems of the productivity of labour and the process of production, the directing of production, cooperation;

- organization and method of work of the management organs: the composition, selection and revocation of the organs of management, delimitation in the functions between the Workers Councils and their management committees, the relation between management and leadership, the role of the collective staff in management, the question of referendum, the problems of management in the large enterprises and in those with remote branch plants;

- the attitude of Workers Councils towards the state organs and social organizations, the association of economic enterprises, the role and character of industrial chambers and economic associations;

- the working relations under conditions of workers self-government;

- technical training, economic and general education of the working class, different forms of training for management as one of indispensable conditions for the successful functioning and further development of self-management organs of direct producers.

Besides these general problems and questions, the congress will specially examine some specific problems of various economic fields or branches, for example:

workers management in transport, in communal enterprises, in enterprises with a seasonal character of labour, in retail trade, in the catering industry, etc.

The congress will examine all these questions in the presence of about two thousand delegates, equipped with a rich fund of experience gained in the past practice and helped by advice, recommendations, requests of nearly two million workers whom they will represent at the congress.

III

It is expected that the Congress of Workers Councils will be attended by many representatives of workers organizations from foreign countries. They will attend the congress as guests, but they will be able to take part in the work of the congress in a special commission which will deal with the forms of participation of the working class of the world in managing enterprises.

Demands for management in economy and the struggle of the working class for the realization of these demands have been arising in the history of the labour movement for over a century. The social-economic development under modern conditions has contributed to making these questions internationally pressing. In some countries this demand has emerged into the forefront. The forms of these organs, as well as the degree of their rights, are different: they exist in a number of countries and through them is realized, on various levels, the participation of the producers in economic life — through consultative, controlling, self-government and management functions. For today's world and for the ideological currents in the contemporary labour movement it is characteristic that a great difference exists in the attitude of individual workers organizations to the participation of producers in economy.

The realization of the workers right to the management of economy is a historical process, a historical inevitability. It is essential for the modern international labour movement to visualize this necessity as well as the inevitability of a series of manifestations in the past and in the world of today. Actually what is involved here is a principle which lives perpetually in the labour movement, which strongly emerges at the time of important social movements and whose realization is today necessary because of the internal development of economy, production and ownership relations.

In view of all this it is understandable why there is a great interest in the world for our experience — for our Workers Councils. But there is hardly less interest in our country for the processes which are evolving in other countries on the same plane.

The exchange of experiences on these problems of the labour movement and socialism, which will be carried out at the congress of our Workers Councils, may be a very significant contribution to mutual acquaintance, exchange of experiences and international cooperation in general.

Honest Socialist Discussion or Unprincipled Controversy

OVER the last few months, and particularly after the October happenings in Poland and Hungary, the Soviet press and the press of some East European countries has carried a large number of articles, dealing with the subjects of relations between socialist countries, proletarian internationalism, and the dictatorship of the proletariat. On the basis of this, at first glance, one might have gained the impression that a very wide discussion of the contemporary problems of socialism was in progress. Regrettably, this impression lasted only so long as one has not read these articles.

If one tried to summarize the basic ideas set forth in the articles bearing such flamboyant titles, as "Hoisting the Flag of Marxist-Leninist Ideology Higher" (the Moscow "Kommunist"), "The Marxist-Leninist Theory — Our Flag and Weapon" (the Moscow "Pravda"), "On the False Slogans of National Communism" ("Soviet Russia"), "What Socialist Internationalism Means" (Radio Sofia), "The Newfangled Revisionists" (the Budapest "Nepszabadsag"), "The Ideas of Marxism-Leninism are Invincible" (the Albanian newspaper "Zeri i Popullit"), etc., etc. — one must reach the following conclusions:

First. The great majority of these writings (of which we have cited but a small part), which hint at ideological-theoretical treatises, are characterized by an absence of any serious effort to make an analysis of the problems confronting the socialist countries and the labour movements today. Besides that, they all are written after identical pattern, with possible variations in the sequence of the same, as a rule scholastic, dead arguments, and with even the same quotations. This very mannerism already shows the authors of these writings to be closing their eyes to reality and life, probably fearing that which is new in contemporary reality, or simply because they are incapable of perceiving the new which is vigorously and irresistibly imposing itself. For them, during the course of so many stormy events that have taken place recently, nothing qualitatively new had happened, or emerged. At best, there had only ensued quantitative changes which, then, can all be explained and explained away by suitable analogies from the fairly distant past. According to their interpretation "all this has happened once before", at that time, twenty, thirty, forty years ago, everything had been said that was necessary, so that, this way, the entire, so important and responsible task of interpreting the today's phenomena and the changing of today's reality comes down to reducing those phenomena and this reality under the corresponding old headings.

The leit-motif of the above mentioned writings is the very one-sided thesis that socialism is threatened by the offensive of reactionary forces and that, therefore, it wants a still closer rallying of the socialist countries and the Communist parties among themselves and around the Soviet Union. This and almost this alone is what is being drawn as the experience from the tragic events in Hungary, as well as from all the other problems that the labour movement had found itself facing and is facing.

We, of course, cannot and do not desire to prevent them from thinking as they do. It is their right, just as it is also our right to think differently. But when they keep advancing their opinions by apostrophizing our conceptions and pretending that only their opinions can and must *a priori* be right, we owe it, to both our and the world public, in the name of equality in discussion, to bring out our own opinions, even if only periodically.

Second. The authors of the writings in one part of the East European press, have in the largest possible measure been denying the existence of inner factors that are retarding socialist development. Ignoring the fundamental, social roots of the Polish and Hungarian events, fighting shy even of the findings adopted at the time of the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union or thereafter, they are inclined to deny, or at least radically minimize, the harmfulness of Stalinist policies, of that complex of social phenomena that had been termed Stalinism. In the recent times, such tendencies have also been manifest in the speeches of some statesmen and party leaders in Eastern Europe.

Neither in this respect can we pretend, of course, that our opinion must be adopted, the opinion of Yugoslav Communists. That is not the point at all. They are condemning us because we hold a differing opinion, and we deem this opinion to be correct. So long as this forms the subject of discussion, we are bound to say openly what we believe. As to who is right, this shall be shown by practice, by the future and not by the largest number of articles.

Third. Nearly all the articles under review include fierce attacks against persons who, allegedly, "under the banner of struggle against Stalinism" (which is increasingly being spoken of as a fiction) and "by highlighting the slogan of national Communism" (which is increasingly being spoken of as though it actually was being preached and advocated) desire to weaken the unity of socialist countries, to break up their camp, to inflict harm on the dictatorship of the proletariat and, in the last analysis and heedlessness of the subjective desires, deliver socialism to its enemies. In this, sometimes indirectly and mostly directly, Yugoslavia is most often mentioned as the source of a supposed attack against the Soviet Union and its experience, as the bearer of "divisionism" and actions against the "unity of socialist countries."

According to this method, the explanation of very complex happenings is made to look quite simple. It boils down to the following: if some interpretation of specific events "benefits the imperialists," then it is wrong by that very fact! Of course, the Yugoslav Communists, as Marxists, can on no account agree with a "thesis" of this kind. That is sheer idealism, more accurately, pragmatism, according to which "objective truth is that which is utilitarian."

Stalinism, for example, "is identical with Communism," as some have been asserting, or it is not identical with it, as we deem, yet the investigating of this objective truth has nothing whatever to do with whether this or that appraisal of it "benefits the imperialists". That which is of importance and which it is necessary to establish is whether and in what measure Stalinism proper is "of benefit to the imperialists," and not keep to subordinating the appraisal itself of the nature of Stalinism to whether such an appraisal is benefiting them or not.

Through the articles of some East European newspapers and broadcasting stations, then, there extends the red thread of polemic with Yugoslavia, with the views, attitudes and acts of Yugoslav Communists.

Perhaps it might not even be necessary again to recall that the communists of this country have been and have remained the champions of an open, sincere and comradely exchange of opinions on the current problems of socialism, ones convinced of its being more necessary today than ever before, if one felt a desire for such a discussion in the authors of the mentioned writings too. Such regrettably, is not the case.

What does the polemic conducted by them look like, what are their arguments like? On this occasion we shall confine ourselves to a few, lightly sketched examples, more accurately, comparisons only.

Yugoslav communists, and not only the Yugoslav communists, have been pointing for years to the need of unconditional respect for equality in the relations between socialist countries and labour movements. Appraisal of historical experiences, confirmed by the latest events, testifies to the first-class importance of this problem, one, incidentally, which also had found its place in last year's Soviet-Yugoslav Declaration, as well as in the Declaration of the Soviet Government of October 30. However, the authors of the above mentioned articles very often claim, contrary to these documents, that no difficulties had ever occurred in the relations between socialist countries or, at best, they pass mutely over them. They disregard the problems that have played a conspicuous role indeed in the October and November events in Eastern Europe. To the serious analyses that necessarily lead to the conclusion that the factual unity of socialist forces can only be realized with strict respect for the independence of every labour movement — their answer is, the absolutely non-argued charge that the critics of the mechanical, bloc "unity" are acting in the direction of breaking up, disuniting the socialist forces and that, this way, "willy-nilly" they are serving the interests of bourgeois reaction. The fact that practice had proved the action of reactionary forces to be much better suited by the conditions of the good old "Stalinist" "unity" and "monolithism" — this fact does not bother them at all.

Second example. Yugoslav communists, and by far and they alone, hold the view that the roads of socialist development can and must be very differing, that, so to say, socialism in every country will be impressed with certain features of the specific terrain and the specific "climate", indeed the specific, distinct conditions. There is no doubt but that many of the experiences

* The following is a translation of an article which appeared in the newspaper "Berba", in Beograd on February 14, 1957.

acquired on such terrain also possesses a wider, general significance, but their adoption or rejection must be a matter of good will. They may even become common features, on the sole condition that they were freely adopted. All this had been referred to at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. However, some of the authors of the articles with ideological-theoretical pretensions that were published on the pages of various organs of Communist parties — which organs themselves also now recognize in principle the variation of the roads of socialist development — are inclined to qualify the application of these principles in practice as an adoption of the conception of "national Communism" and as "revisionism". And the "Rude Pravo", of Prague, recently provided the neat explanation that propagation of "national Communism" only served as a prelude to an attack on socialism generally, which, depending on what is meant thereby, may even prove correct. In effect, the phrase about "national Communism" had grown out of the pages of the bourgeois press, and now it is being taken over by the press of some Communist parties also. With this it is being attempted to conceal the true character of the dispute and the impression is being created as though the dispute revolved around nationalism and not the progress of socialism. To the bourgeois press this had been necessary so as to conceal before the working men of the world the possible perspectives of the progress of socialism, and now some conservative elements in the individual Communist parties are accepting this same false characteristic of our struggle as a justification for the factual retarding of the progress of socialism. And the fact that Yugoslav Communists, who are ever more openly being cited as the bearers of the idea of "National Communism" have never even mentioned such a "Communism," (but solely those numerous problems to which we have referred), does not bother our "critics" a bit. For that matter, the objection made to us from one moment to the next is that we are failing to see that which is common to socialist countries, or that just we ourselves are against differing roads to socialism.

Within this example one should also mention the more and more frequently reiterated assertion that the Yugoslavs are seeking to impose their "road", their "model", that is, their political and economic solutions, on other socialist countries, or else, as the Moscow "Kommunist" wrote, "under the banner of the creative development of Marxism" to completely erase the historical experiences of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union which had been tested and confirmed by the whole process of social development in the last decades." In connection with an article by comrade Marija Vilfan in the Beograd "Review of International Affairs," the Moscow "Novoye Vremya" found that "she had attempted to suggest that these forms (the forms of development of socialist countries) were sound only in case they followed the pattern of Yugoslavia." Here we meet with an effort to impute intents of such a kind to the very country that is fighting most consistently against every attempt to impose one's own practice on others. To say nothing of the fact that, even if — unreasonably — we desired to do so, we do not dispose, compared to others, with some other material strength beyond our mere existence. And this strength could be both very little and very large, independently from our ability and the will to "interfere" in the affairs of others and to "impose" our own practice, and depending exclusively on whether others deemed one or another experience of ours to be for them or not. The best defence, however, they say, is offence.

Along with all this, finally, there also stands the fact that even ordinary information about Yugoslavia, about her political and economic life, is served up supposedly objectively, and in actual fact maliciously, one-sidedly, with the desire to show how the "Yugoslav experience" (which we are presumably, striving so tenaciously to impose on others) brings, first of all, economic anarchy and political disorientation.

Third example. Yugoslav communists, and many, many other communists too, consider that socialism is exposed to the serious danger of bureaucratism, stagnation, degeneration, unless there be ensured a more and more active, more and more direct participation of the producers in the management of the economy and the state, that which Marx termed the "withering away" of the state. Therein lies, in conditions of socialist development, the social essence of democratization. Evading consistently every constructive discussion of this problem, which definitely stands at the head of the list of problems of contemporary socialism, the writers of the articles under review are contenting themselves with equating every criticism of bureaucratic centralism with an attack on the dictatorship of the proletariat. The fact that practice had proved that bureaucratic centralism can lead to a complete split between the leadership of the workers' party and the working class, that a dictatorship styled as "proletarian" was liable to be everything else but that, just for the reason that it was not filled with democratic content — does not seem to worry them. This

way absurdities can be borne: those who are striving for an expansion of the rights of and the factual strengthening of the authority of the working class can be accused of a near-conspiracy against the state authority of the working class.

But here, too, it is pertinent to add that Yugoslav communists have their viewpoint, while others, of course, may hold differing opinions on the same question. If we, both the ones and the others, are in favour that such an important problem be discussed — then discussed it should be, yet this must be done openly freely and on equal terms. Such a discussion we can consider as desirable and useful.

At all events, advancement of views could and should be practiced in a constructive, factually principled form wherein it will not be indispensable to set forth one's views with a polemical denouncing of differing views and differing experiences.

Thus do matters stand. On the one hand are our conscientious efforts for a principled analysis of the problems facing socialism, and on the other — a polemical action devoid of arguments but replete with obscure insinuations and tendentious accusations. It is impossible not to perceive that one part of the East European press, acting under the heading of theoretical discussion, actually conducts this controversy with its ears completely stopped up in advance, insensitive to proofs and facts, ordinarily reiterating certain general truisms mingled with unjustified attacks against entire Communist parties and their policies. Posing as the "injured" and supposedly "assaulted" party, the participants in this polemical campaign shirk not at all from insulting Yugoslavia. An indefatigable, feverish quest for truth, which would have to be the paramount method of discussion, is all too often supplanted by them with neglect of truth. Objective representation of the attitudes of others and their serious, critical analysis — with attempts at discrediting.

In this, one should clearly say that, in the appraisal of past events in any one country, that is, of all that which belongs to the history of socialism, there should be permitted a completely free formation of judgments. It is inconceivable that which has become significant for the overall development of socialism, and thus its overall problem, must not be dealt with for the reason that such a discussion affected, indirectly, the present policy of a determinate country, no matter what country it be.

We must observe that that part of the report of the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Shepilov, submitted at the joint session of both houses of the Supreme Soviet, which bore on the Soviet-Yugoslav relations, has not been devoid either of at least curious findings, similar to those one meets on the pages or a part of the press in Eastern Europe.

Shepilov has said:

"I have already said that as result of the efforts made by the Government of the Soviet Union and reciprocated by the Government of Yugoslavia relations between the USSR and the Federal Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia have been normalized. We shall continue taking all necessary steps to make Soviet-Yugoslav relations develop successfully on the basis of friendship and equality. At present, however, this chiefly depends on the leaders of the Yugoslav Republic in as much as within Yugoslavia there are still manifestations of ill will and even open attacks against the USSR and a number of peoples' democracies by certain elements. We regret this because such facts, undoubtedly, hamper our common cause."

While greeting the desire "to have the Soviet-Yugoslav relations developing successfully on a friendly and equal basis", we must add at once that the tendentious formulation allowing the impression that the normalizing of relations between the two countries is primarily the result of the efforts of the Soviet Government is unacceptable. Yugoslavia bears no guilt at all for these relations having been abnormal. She had ceaselessly emphasized her readiness for the relations again to become normal, but it is self-understood that, after everything that happened, the initiative for the first practical measures was due to come from the Soviet side. As in the past, development of Soviet-Yugoslav relations "on a friendly and equal basis" now also depends on the good will and the efforts of both sides, and this means on the Soviet Government, for the Yugoslav views and the Yugoslav attitudes have remained unchanged.

That which gives cause for special concern in Shepilov's reports is the fact that he had resorted to the method of non-argued charges against Yugoslavia which, such as they are, to paraphrase the words of the Soviet minister, sound as an "outburst" indeed. One cannot escape the impression that, in point of fact, Shepilov also is trying to qualify certain views and appraisals advanced in Yugoslavia as an attack on the Soviet Union, merely because they differ from the views and appraisals of the Soviet Government and the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. What is more, such statements can even be

interpreted as an attitude to the effect that the Yugoslav-Soviet relations can go developing as friendly only in case Yugoslav communists adopted those Soviet ideological positions around which there exist differences today.

This way, Shepilov links the discussion on the problems of socialism, which in the U.S.S.R. is being conducted in the manner we have described, together with the Soviet-Yugoslav interstate relations. And this can on no account be useful.

The speeches and articles of Yugoslav communists, held and published at the time when the problems of socialist development had particularly markedly come to the fore in the Hungarian events, have been imbued with the endeavour to effect as allembancingly as possible and as objectively as possible, without prejudices but also without concealing the facts, an analysis of the difficulties in the development of the socialist movement. Regrettably, the answers have been forthcoming in a form such as to make objective discussion impossible. They lack the fundamental qualities for such a discussion. This is one of the reasons why we have not deemed it necessary to polemize with the multitudinous attacks on Yugoslav policy.

Our communists and our public consider that discussion between communist parties, which is indispensable and in which differing viewpoints also necessarily must manifest themselves, should constitute no obstacle at all in interstate relations. As for the ideological unity of socialist forces we believe that it would be growing considerably stronger through clarification of the disputed questions and sincere discussions rather than through insistence upon a mechanical unity that had shown itself as problematic, unreal, on so many occasions already. Moreover, this is the sole way to attain it. In so far as this is realizable in the foreseeable future. More probably, in view of the magnitude of the problems and the profound differences in attitudes, much more time will be necessary to achieve such unity. In the interval the concept of unity will be able to emancipate itself from its bloc content which, whether we like it or not it is linked with.

Least of all will it be possible to attain unity by an unprincipled polemic that is assuming more and more the form of a deliberate campaign, spiced with anti-Yugoslav accusations. Meanwhile, we firmly retain the viewpoint that differences in outlook upon ideological problems, as, for that matter, upon the different questions of international policy also, must not necessarily form an obstacle to fruitful development of interstate relations, for which there exist wide possibilities. The continuation of such a campaign against Yugoslavia, a campaign in which there already are many non-ideological elements, might aggravate the realization of these possibilities. Yugoslav communists remain by the standpoint that the mutual relations should be appraised and directed not on the basis of that which has not come true out of the unreal desires and plans, but on the basis of that which already has been realized, in the first place in the interstate relations. On the basis of the results, then, which in no case are to be underrated, on the basis of the results achieved in the fields in which, the satisfying of many common interests has been achieved and, in which it has been shown that co-operation can also further very successfully be developed.

An Institute for the Study of the Labour Movement

By decision of the Presidency of the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia, an Institute has been set up in Beograd for the study of the labour movement. This Institute whose director will be Puniša Perović, member of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, will deal with the current problems of the labour organizations in the world and maintain connections with all the similar institutions abroad.

The Institute will not occupy itself with the history of workers organizations and their mutual relations in the remote past, but will centre its activity on the study of the contemporary labour movement. The programme of the Institute foresees the study of the activity of labour organizations in the countries of Western and Eastern Europe, North and South America, in Asian and African countries.

The Institute will be a scientific institution. Soon it will start publishing the "Bulletin on the International Labour Movement" in which it will publish documents and articles on the life of communist, socialist and other workers parties, national

trade union federations and their central international organizations as well as all the other international organizations of the working class. The Institute will also begin, as part of its independent publishing activity, a special series entitled Labour Movement Library, intended for the wider public. This series will see the publication in the first place of the materials from the Eighth Congress of the Communist Party of Italy and the Eighth Plenum of the Polish United Workers Party.

CHRONOLOGY

February 1st. — The delegation of the Yugoslav Veterans Federation who visited Poland, and the Polish Federation of the Fighters for Freedom and Democracy, issued a communique on mutual talks in Warsaw stating the common views on the activity of the two organizations and establishing various forms of mutual ties and cooperation.

February 1st. — Talks of the Yugoslav-French trade commission devoted to the problems of commercial exchanges between the two countries have been terminated in Beograd. The Commission adopted the recommendations for increasing the exchanges by the end of June this year, when the current trade agreement expires.

February 2nd. — The composition of the Yugoslav parliamentary delegation which will visit Great Britain from March 4th till 14th at the invitation of the speakers of the British Houses of Parliament — has been determined. The Yugoslav delegation will be headed by the President of the Federal People's Assembly Moša Pijade.

February 5th. — Representatives of the British Civilian Administration for Air Transport and the Yugoslav Administration of Civilian Transport have reached an agreement on the establishment of air transport between Great Britain and Yugoslavia.

February 5th. — A convention has been signed in Brussels on cultural cooperation between Belgium and Yugoslavia. The implementation of this convention, concluded for five years, will provide possibilities for wide exchange of professors, experts, cultural and scientific workers between the two countries as well as mutual rapprochement in the field of culture.

February 9th. — A Protocol has been signed in Moscow on the further cooperation between Yugoslavia and USSR in the field of research and utilization of nuclear energy. The Protocol was signed on behalf of Yugoslavia by Nikola Minčev member of the Federal Executive Council, and on behalf of the USSR by the Chief of the Main Directorate for Economic Relations K. I. Kovalj.

February 11. — Representatives of Yugoslavia, Western Germany, Austria and Italy, founded in Ljubljana the study society "Yugelexport" whose aim is to study the legal, economic, technical and financial aspects of the construction of hydroelectric power stations in Yugoslavia whose energy would be exported to those three European countries (see the section entitled "Documents").

February 7th. — After a ten-day stay in Poland the Yugoslav cooperative delegation, headed by Rista Antunović, has returned to Beograd.

February 8th. — At the regular press conference in the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs, the official spokesman of the Secretariat confirmed the report according to which negotiations have been suspended between the chambers of commerce of Yugoslavia and Eastern Germany and pointed to the incorrect actions of the Eastern German authorities. On the same occasion it was stated that 16,912 Hungarians have fled to Yugoslavia to date.

February 12th. — Representatives of the Yugoslav Government met the members of the Hungarian mission for repatriation in Beograd. The meeting was also attended by M. Pierre Bremont a representative of the High Commissioner of UNO for Refugees. A mixed Yugoslav-Hungarian Commission was formed. In the presence of M. Bremont it will repatriate, on February 14 and 16 at the frontier crossings at Subotica and Beli Manastir, those refugees who wish to return to Hungary.

February 13th. — The committee for the preparation of the first congress of Workers Councils has decided that the congress be held in Beograd from June 25th till June 27th. The preparations committee has been widened by the inclusion of another 24 members, representatives of the Socialist Alliance, the Trade Union Federation and some social and economic organizations. The Secretariat of the Committee has also been widened and leaders of the groups for the preparation of the congress have been chosen. Twelve leaders of preparatory groups will draw up the reports for the commissions to be formed at the congress.

February 13th. — An agreement has been reached between the Governments of Yugoslavia and the USA on the further realization of 1,200,000,000 dinars accrued from the counterpart funds. This amount will be used for advancement of agriculture, training of personnel, reclamation of land and improving embankments against floods on the Danube and Sava rivers.

February 14th. — The Yugoslav Government and the High Commissioner of UNO for Refugees have reached an agreement on the opening in Beograd of a provisional office of the High Commissioner of UNO for Refugees. In close cooperation with the Yugoslav Government, this Office will work for the solution of problems of Hungarian refugees in Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav Government agreed that the Office be open until the problem of Hungarian refugees continues to claim the attention of the authorities and M. Pierre Bremont was appointed, with its approval, as representative of the High Commissioner of UNO for Refugees in Beograd.

February 14th. — The Yugoslav enterprise "Adriatic Free Navigation" has opened a new line for the transport of cargo between Rumania and the Near East.

DIPLOMATIC CHRONICLE

February 1st. — The Yugoslav Ambassador in Vienna Dr Radivoje Uvalić visited the Foreign Minister of Austria Leopold Figl and had a talk with him on relations between the two countries.

February 1st. — The new French Ambassador in Beograd Vincent Broustra laid a wreath at the Unknown Soldier's Tomb on Mount Avala.

February 2nd. — The new Minister of Cambodia in Beograd Var Kamel presented the copies of his Letters of Credence to the State Secretary Koča Popović.

February 4th. — The President of the Republic Josip Broz Tito received the representative of the Japanese Government and member of Parliament Massanola Tsuji.

February 4th. — The new Cambodian Minister to Yugoslavia Var Kamel presented his Letters of Credence to the President of the Republic Josip Broz Tito.

February 5th. — The Yugoslav Ambassador in Paris Dr Aleš Bebler visited, at his invitation, the French Prime Minister Guy Mollet. The conversation was about relations between the two countries and current international questions.

February 5th. — A reception was given in the Yugoslav Embassy in Paris in honour of the prominent French medical men, the pioneers of close cooperation with Yugoslavia. On this occasion Ambassador Bebler presented Yugoslav decorations to ten doctors.

February 5th. — The Turkish Ambassador in Beograd Sadi Kavour was appointed Turkish representative in the Committee of the Permanent Secretariat of the Balkan Alliance, while his deputy will be the Counsellor of the Embassy Fikret Berker. The Greek representative will be the Ambassador Philon Philon, and his deputy the Counsellor of the Embassy Jasson Drakussis.

February 5th. — The Yugoslav Ambassador in Athens Mišo Pavčević visited the Minister in the Presidency of the Government Constantine Tsatsos and spoke with him about questions of interest for the two countries.

February 6th. — The Yugoslav Ambassador in Budapest Jovo Kapčić visited the Hungarian Prime Minister Janos Kadar. This was the first visit after the presentation of the Letters of Credence.

February 9th. — The President of the Republic Josip Broz Tito received in a farewell call the Minister of Lebanon Mohamed Ali Hamade, who is leaving to take a new office.

February 9th. — The Yugoslav Ambassador in Cairo Josip Đerda visited the head of the Political Cabinet of the Egyptian Republic Ali Sabri.

February 11th. — The President of the Republic Josip Broz Tito received the Yugoslav Ambassador in Moscow Veljko Mićunović before his departure for the USSR.

February 13th. — The Yugoslav Ambassador in Cairo Josip Đerda paid a visit to the Egyptian Minister of Industry Aziz Sidky and had a conversation with him.

February 13th. — After spending some time in Beograd for regular consultations, the Yugoslav Ambassador in Great Britain Ivo Vejvoda returned to London.

Fortnight in the World

Two Initiatives from Moscow

INITIATIVES are always welcome, even when the proposals which they contain are far from practical realization. They are almost as a rule an expression of good will and wish for maintaining contact. The proposals which have lately been sent from Moscow for the attention of the Western countries have this characteristic although it would be necessary to make an analysis of other factors as well in order to reach a more complex estimation of their character. (Among these factors one particularly notes the elements arising from the coincidence of Moscow initiatives with some moves of the Western partners).

USSR — GERMANY. At first veiled in mystery, Bulganin's message to Adenauer soon became one of the central themes of European diplomacy. Cropping up at a period of quiet stagnation in Soviet-German relations, which, contrary to expectations, followed the conclusion of diplomatic relations, Bulganin's message conveyed to the old Chancellor the wish of the Soviet Government for seeking new solutions to problems which have been hopelessly vegetating in Bonn-Moscow relations. It might be said that the message contains a maximum and a minimum programme, and that its practical value will have (considering this first West German reactions) a double fate.

First. The minimum programme contains practical measures which might be taken in the near future: conclusion of a trade agreement (German business circles,

interested in the traditional Eastern markets, are awaiting this with impatience), the conclusion of a cultural convention and arrangement on scientific and technical cooperation, as well as the regulation of consular relations and question of repatriation of nationals from both countries. Although problems involved here are immanently a characteristic of normal inter-state relations, any agreement in this field would constitute — in view of the realistic situation and existing antagonisms — a significant contribution to the creation of a better atmosphere and positions from which one might make a start towards more important political solutions. It is assumed that Adenauer, in expressing himself positively on some parts of Bulganin's message, thought not only about its general tone (which is said to breathe a new spirit and to be devoid of polemical notes), but also particularly to these elements.

Second. The maximal programme revives the "eternal" themes: the problem of German unification and European security. Pointing to the readiness of the Soviet Government to help the Governments of Western and Eastern Germany in finding a platform for unification, Bulganin especially emphasized that the question of war or peace in Europe depends on the German and Soviet peoples. If the thesis that without negotiations with Pankow there can be no unification, revives an old attitude of principle (still unacceptable for Adenauer) the pythonic formula of Bulganin to the effect that he "attaches great significance to the voice of the German people in discussions on basic international problems" has provided a basis for the biggest optimists in Bonn to draw the conclusion that the USSR, in case Adenauer accepts certain suggestions, would agree to Germany joining the world concert of great powers. In view of the fact that this would involve a serious reorientation of the present Bonn policy — which has lately been noticeably more elastic in relation to the East but not at all prepared for more radical turns — many points in this part of Bulganin's message will remain in the sphere of general wishes, of one or the other side.

All in all, in this West German election year, the attitude of Adenauer towards Bulganin's message may strengthen his position, but also weaken it. The chances taken may increase his authority which has been maintained so far solely with western leanings, while lost chances may strengthen the positions of the Social-Democrats. Here is Adenauer's dilemma, and, to a certain extent, an explanation of the motives for the Moscow initiative at this moment.

USSR — MIDDLE EAST In its notes to the Governments of the Western powers Moscow proposed the principles which should take the form of a joint declaration on the policy in respect of the Middle East:

a) Solution of important questions exclusively by peaceful means and by way of negotiations;

b) Non-interference in affairs of the Middle East countries, as well as respecting of their sovereignty and independence;

c) Renouncing of attempts to include the countries of this region in military blocs whose members are the great powers;

d) Liquidation of foreign bases and withdrawal of foreign troops from the Middle East countries;

e) Joint decision not to supply arms to Middle East countries;

f) Aid for the economic development of the Middle East countries without any political, military or other conditions.

What is involved here is obviously the principles which have been included in the code of active coexistence and which are

contained in the intentions of the Bialina Conference. This is the reason why the Soviet proposal, in view of the elements it contains, has met in the main with a positive reception among the Arab countries, although they object to its being sent only to the great powers — that is for having a bloc orientation — and not to countries whose fate is involved so that it in a sense minimizes the role of the United Nations. However, it is much more important to know at this moment what can be the realistic reach of this new Soviet step.

The first reactions of Washington have clearly shown that the USA is not prepared to abandon the lay-out of its new policy in the Middle East, which includes the first, second and sixth points of the Soviet proposal, but which is incompatible with points 3, 4 and 5. For the State Department, the basic intention of the Soviet proposal is to broaden the vacuum in the Middle East, while the basic imperative of Eisenhower's Doctrine is precisely to fill up that vacuum. A similar view is taken by London and Paris, who especially accentuate the need for their reaffirmation in the Middle East.

It is natural, therefore, that the Soviet proposal will chiefly remain in the coordinates of the propaganda duel over the Middle East, especially because it has to a great extent the characteristic of a reply to the Eisenhower Doctrine. But, the fact remains, nonetheless, that this act defines the attitude of a great power towards the Middle East problems — which is in itself a significant matter. And one should not underestimate the effect of the Soviet proposal on the Middle East countries. This explains why it was submitted to the Western powers, although a positive answer could not have been expected from their side.

Initiatives are always useful — undoubtedly; their actual value, however, could fully be expressed only if they received the form and confirmation of an effective political practice.

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